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Abstract 
The paper intends to show what consequences the separability presumption can have for the choice of law that applies to 
arbitration agreements, namely the consequences that involve the application of different choices of law and its accepted 
standards. When discussing the separability and its consequences it is hard to keep the line and at the same time not to shake 
the assumption that already exist in International commercial arbitration. The purpose of this paper is to show the inconsisten-
cies that exist nowadays. 
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Introduction
One of the direct consequences that separability doctrine can 
have is the possibility of laws applicable to the parties’ main 
contract be different from the one that is applicable to the 
arbitration agreement. That is, despite the fact that the par-
ties’ main contract may be represented explicitly, or impliedly, 
by the laws of one state, the related arbitration agreement 
or clause may be governed by the laws of other states, or 
even by the standards of worldwide law. The result, no doubt 
comes from the separability doctrine, as its main assumption 
is that there are two different, separate contracts and the in-
validity or nullity of one of them is not the burden for any of it 
to be declared as invalid or null. In addition, it may in principle 
be governed by two different legal regimes. As it was pointed 
out in one of the arbitral awards, “an arbitration clause in an 
international contract may perfectly well be governed by a law 
different from that applicable to the underlying contract” (ICC 
Case No. 1507, p. 216).  However, it should be stressed that, 
the doctrine of separability does not mean that the law that 
governs the arbitration agreement or clause should always 
be separate. It simply states that it is a possibility for another 
law to be applicable to the arbitration agreement or to main 
contract1  (ICC case No. 4131, 1984, pp. 131, 132). Often in 
practice the law applicable to both arbitration agreement and 
the main contract are the same2  (ICC Case No. 5294, p. 140-
42, ICC Case No. 3572, p. 111).
Subsequently, challenges to the validity of the main con-
tract do not deprive the tribunal from the jurisdiction to resolve 
the dispute concerning to the contested contract. Likely, chal-
lenges to the main contract does not deprive an arbitral award 
from validity. The conclusion taken by the court or the tribunal 
that the main contract is invalid do not necessarily weaken an 
award rendered by the tribunal.
The substantive legal rules, governing the main contract 
may be different from the law that governs the arbitration agree-
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1 Interim Award in ICC Case No. 4131, IX Y.B. Comm. Arb. 131, 132 (1984) (“sources of applicable law for determining the scope and the 
effects of an arbitration clause, which is the basis of an international arbitration, are not necessarily the same as the law applicable to the 
merits of the dispute referred to this arbitration”). 
2 Final Award in ICC Case No. 5294, XIV Y.B. Comm. Arb. 137, 140-41 (1989) (applying Swiss law to both arbitration agreement and un-
derlying contract); See also, Final Award in ICC Case No. 3572, XIV Y.B. Comm. Arb. 111 (1989) (applying law chosen by parties to govern 
underlying contract to arbitration agreement).
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ment. The arbitration agreement/clause may survive expiration 
or termination of the main contract, as long as the claims arise 
from or during the term of specific provisions that survived the 
agreement.
Choice of Law
The choice of the law that governs arbitration agreement is a 
complex matter. Based on theoretical point of view, it is pos-
sible for the arbitration agreement to be governed by the law 
that is different from the main contract. Various commentators, 
national courts and arbitral tribunals applied and developed 
different types of choice of law rules to the substantive valid-
ity of international arbitration agreements, starting from the law 
chosen by the parties, to the law of arbitral seat and to the law 
of the state with the most significant relationship or the closest 
connection. This variety of different choice of law rules can lead 
to unfortunate uncertainties, uncertainties that can aggravate 
different issues associated to arbitration agreements, such as 
diverse laws applicable to the issue of substantive or formal va-
lidity, interpretation, capacity or assignment and even to issues 
of non-arbitrability. 
One of the existing approaches to determining the law ap-
plicable to arbitration agreement is the law that governs the 
main contract. So the law chosen by the parties, express choice 
of law. Some commentators recognize the fact that this express 
choice of law extends to arbitration agreements too (Born G., 
2004, p. 515, 580). The reason for this view was justified by the 
fact that, when an ordinary person enters into the contractual 
relationship, they do not consider that two different laws shall 
govern their main contract and arbitration agreement, but the 
chosen law will imply both main and separate agreement. Prac-
tice affirms this approach too. Basically the same approach is 
taken regarding the absence of choice of law. In this case some 
authors state that, although separability do entail that law appli-
cable to main contract is different, it does not necessarily mean 
that it will be so. They more lean to conclusion that one law gov-
erns both, main contract and the arbitration agreement.
Second approach is application of arbitral seat as a law 
governing the arbitration agreement in case there is no express 
choice of law made by the parties. This approach is widely ac-
cepted by a lot of national courts. One of the bright examples of 
this way is taken by the English courts. 
Third approach is related to the “closest connection”.  
Based on one of the English court’s recent decision in 
Sulamerica Cia National v Enesa Engenharia S.A. despite 
the fact that there was an express choice of Brazilian Law 
(policy was governed by the Brazilian Law), the judge deciding 
this case held that the proper law based on the case circum-
stances and the applica-tion of the closest connection test 
was English law. He pointed out that choice of the arbitral seat 
determines the jurisdiction of the courts of the country, where 
the seat is located and the “curial” law. Though he failed to 
emphasize more on the Brazilian Law, as under the Brazilian 
law the arbitration agreement was invalid, separate consent 
was needed in order to bind parties to arbitration.
In my point of view, the critical analyses of these different 
law approach would be that they give unsatisfactory and un-
certain results. Application of the arbitral seat is based on the 
exclusivity of the procedural matters and ignoring the contrac-
tual personality of the arbitration agreement (Gaillard, Savage, 
1999, p.424) e.g. when it is difficult to resist the fact that the law 
of the contract governs the arbitration agreement or the clause 
incorporated in the contract, for instance, in articles of associa-
tion or joint venture agreements. 
As for the closest connection test, it includes the problem 
of applying different law factors, in order to get to that one ap-
plicable law. Often the choice has less meaningful connection 
to the case than the law of the contract. In my opinion, the de-
fect of the closest connection test resulted in Sulamerica case, 
when the court adopted that the law applicable to the dispute 
was the English law as the closest connection to the arbitral 
seat; whereas there was an explicit choice of law clause for the 
Brazilian Law. In addition, this defect is shown by fast shift in 
relatively short period of time from the chosen law to the law of 
the arbitral seat in English law and not only in UK.
Choice of Law Approach Taken in Sulamerica 
Case
Case Background:
The dispute was related to the construction of the hydroelectric 
generating dam plant in Brazil, also known as JirauGreemfield 
Hydro Project. In March 2011 certain incident arose between 
the consortium of Brazilian construction companies and Brazil-
ian insurers that led the insured to file a claim over coverage for 
substantial damage that was caused during a workers’ protest. 
The policy contained an express provision regarding the choice 
of law in favor of Brazilian Law, in addition with the exclusive 
jurisdiction also by the Brazilian Courts. A part from this, it also 
contained mediation and arbitration clause under the ARIAS 
Arbitration Rules, with the arbitration seat in London, England.
On the one hand, insurers before the Judge argued that 
they had commenced valid arbitration proceedings. On the oth-
er hand, the insured claimed that under Brazilian law, in order 
for them to be validly bound by the arbitration, their consent was 
needed. Additionally, the right to refer dispute to arbitration is 
only possible if the requirements contained in condition 11 were 
met, meaning that first case should have been settled by the 
means of mediation. 
However, as the insured stated under the Brazilian Law the 
arbitration agreement is not valid against them, if there is no 
consent from their side, this was the issue to be determined by 
the court in order to continue anti-suit injunctions. Despite the 
fact that the judge mentioned nothing regarding the position un-
der the Brazilian Law, he held that the proper law to be consid-
ered is English Law, as the London was the seat of arbitration 
and therefore had the most real and closest connection to seat, 
nevertheless the fact, that there was express choice of Brazilian 
Law and the explicit connection of policy to Brazil. 
On appeal, the council on behalf of consortium disputed 
that there was an implied choice of Brazilian law as the law that 
governed arbitration agreement. On the basis of several factors 
consortium argued that (1) policy was subject to Brazilian Law, 
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(2) any disputes connecting to the policy was to be settled by 
the courts of Brazil, so called exclusive jurisdiction, (3) there was 
a close commercial relationship between Brazil and the Policy, 
(4) mediation as a pre-condition to the arbitration was governed 
by the law of Brazil.  Thus, consortium agreed that there was no 
explicit choice of law that governed the arbitration agreement. 
On other side the insurers used the separability doctrine and 
choice of England Law as the seat of the arbitration.
Court Decision:
Despite the fact that there was an express choice of Brazil-
ian Law (policy was governed by the Brazilian Law), the judge 
deciding this case held that the proper law based on the case 
circumstances was English law. He pointed out that choice of 
the arbitral seat determines the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
country, where the seat is located and the “curial” law. 
As to Lord Justice Moore-Bick, he analyzed the historical 
background of the case beginning with the views of Lord Mustill 
in various early cases. In Black Clawson International Ltd v Pa-
pierwerkeWaldhof -Aschaffenburg AG3 ,Mustill J. stated that 
“Where the laws diverge at all, one will find in most in-
stances that the law   governing the continuous agree-
ment [arbitration agreement] is the same as the sub-
stantive law of the contract in which it is embodied and 
that the law of the reference is the same as the lexfori.”  
In addition, “In the ordinary way, [the proper law of the 
arbitration agreement] would be likely to follow the law 
of the substantive contract”. 
Similar observations were held by Lord Mustell in Channel 
Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd4  :
“It is by now firmly established that more than one na-
tional system of law may bear upon an international ar-
bitration. Thus, there is the proper law which regulates 
the substantive rights and duties of the parties to the 
contract from which the dispute has arisen. Exception-
ally, this may differ from the national law governing the 
interpretation of the agreement to submit the dispute 
to arbitration. Less exceptionally it may also differ from 
the national law which the parties have expressly or 
by implication selected to govern the relationship be-
tween themselves and the arbitrator in the conduct of 
the arbitration: the “curial law” of the arbitration as it is 
often called”.
A number of other cases were mentioned by Lord Jus-
tice Moore-Bick supporting the view that parties intend, when 
choosing governing law to the main contract that same con-
tract shall govern the arbitration agreement too. However, Lord 
Justice Moore-Bick mentions that nowadays a shift occurred 
in English courts according to the “C v D, [2007] EWCA Civ 
1282, [2008] 1 A11 E.R. (Comm) 1001”5  and “XL Insurance 
Ltd v Owens Corning [2001] 1 A11 E.R. (Comm) 5306 ” cases. 
Particularly, Lord Justice discussed in his decision the speech 
of Lord Justice Longmore in CvD in which he referred to a differ-
ent passage from Lord Mustill J in “Black Clawson International 
case” that read:
“It has I believe, been generally accepted that in an arbitra-
tion case with a foreign element, three systems of law are po-
tentially relevant. Namely: (i) The law governing the substantive 
contract. (ii) The law governing the agreement to arbitrate. (iii) 
The Law of the place where the reference is to be conducted: 
the lexfori. In the great majority of the cases, these three laws 
will be the same. But this will not always be so. It is by no means 
uncommon for the proper law of the substantive contract to be 
different from the lexfori; and it does happen, although much 
more rarely, that the law governing the arbitration agreement is 
also different from the lexfori”.         
From this passage Lord Justice Longmore concluded that 
it was infrequent for the law governing the arbitration agreement 
to be different from the law that governed the main contract. It is 
so, because an arbitration agreement usually has the most real 
and closest connection to the law of the seat of the arbitration. 
Similar, approach was taken by Toulson J in XL Insurance case, 
where parties impliedly agreed that the law of the seat London 
governs the arbitration agreement, thus if parties had chosen 
the proper law of the contract, that was New York, it might have 
not been valid. By stating for the arbitration in London and re-
ferring to the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996, the parties 
agreed on English law as a law that governs issues within the 
scope of the act, inclusive of the jurisdiction of the arbitrators 
and the formal validity of the arbitration agreement.
Lord Justice Moore-Bick observed that: 
“the difference in emphasis the views expressed in the 
earlier authorities and those to be found in the more 
recent cases is, I think, mainly due to the different de-
grees of importance that has been attached to the par-
ties expressed choice of law to govern the substantive 
contract, reinforced by a more acute awareness of the 
separable nature of the arbitration agreement”.
Even though in Sulamerica case there is a strong indication 
in favor of an implied choice of Brazilian Law as a law governing 
the arbitration agreement, Lord Justice Moore-Bick points out 
two important factors that weights against this. 
First, as parties may knew that their choice of the seat of 
the arbitration – London will bring the English law applicable to 
the case, including its application to the process of arbitral pro-
ceedings, it can be understood that parties intended English law 
to be applicable to all aspects of arbitration agreement. Second, 
3 Black Clawson International Ltd v PapierwerkeWaldhof -Aschaffenburg AG; HL 5 MAR 1975;
4 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd HL 17 FEB 1993;
5 C v D [2007] EWCA Civ 1282 and XL Insurance v Owens Corning CLC 914 [2001];
6 XL Insurance Ltd v Owens Corning  1 A11 E.R. (Comm) 530 [2001]
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consortium’s argument that the arbitration agreement was not 
enforceable against them without their consent is unlikely to be 
true as parties would not have entered into such a one-sided 
arrangement. Therefore, Lord Justice Moore-Bike determined 
that this argument lacked sufficient evidence for the fact that 
parties made an implicit choice in favor of Brazilian law as the 
law governing the arbitration agreement. Further, according to 
the analyses made by the judge, he reached the conclusion that 
the proper law was the law of England.
As for the Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Neuberger, 
agreed with Lord Justice Moore-Bick, but additionally he point-
ed out that it was irrelevant to choose between CvD or other 
earlier cases, as the result under either approaches would have 
been the same. He strongly believed that English law was the 
proper law for this case, as unless the insured were willing to 
consent to arbitration, giving the effect to arbitration agreement 
would have been impossible.  
Analysis
The approach illustrated by the “C v D” case has introduced a 
number of uncertainties in English Law, which leads to some 
difficulties for commercial parties, when the issue of separabil-
ity is on stake.  In describing the current problem between the 
approaches taken in C v D and earlier cases, the Master of the 
Rolls was right when he named it as an “unsatisfactory 
tension”. What should a court do? Should the analysis be 
stated with the presumption that the arbitration agreement is 
governed by the law of the seat – the approach that is taken in 
more new cases – or should he follow the old rule – the proper 
law of the contract? It is a big question nowadays, thought 
those two approaches try to stretch the fairly bright line which 
law is arguably a better one.
Facing this problem nowadays, we can expect from the par-
ties that they would expressly mention what law governs their 
arbitration agreement. Thus, this is not happening in practice. 
The reason for this could be the fact that parties do not think on 
the stage of drafting the agreement or the arbitration clause that 
the law that they have already provided the main contract can 
differ from the law that governs their dispute clause. 
Historically, the law was that the court should have to look 
in order to determine whether parties made an express or im-
plied choice of law before the conflict of law rules were used to 
see the law applicable. The courts moved far from this meth-
odology for two reasons, both of which may authentically be 
addressed: (a) the law of the seat is the closest and the most 
real connection to arbitration agreement, (b) separability of the 
arbitration agreement means that it is an autonomous and dis-
tinct from the main contract. 
The question that arises from the Sulamérica decision is 
whether it sufficiently clears the uncertainties that exist in the 
law. I should agree with the sequence of analysis made by the 
Lord Justice Moore-Bick: (1) express choice; (2) implied choice; 
then (3) the law with the closest and most real connection with 
the arbitration agreement. He clarified correctly in paragraph 
26:  “A search for an implied choice of proper law to govern 
the arbitration agreement is therefore likely (as the dicta in the 
earlier cases indicate) to lead to the conclusion that the par-
ties intended the arbitration agreement to be governed by the 
same system of law as the substantive contract, unless there 
are other factors present which point to a different conclusion.” 
The arguments pointed out in the Sulamérica decision, 
have added some valuable clarity to the disarray that has 
crawled into the subject of which law governs the arbitration 
agreement in a contract,where the law chosen for the contract 
and the seat for the arbitration allude to distinctive jurisdictions. 
Master Justice Moore-Bick effectively set out the best possi-
ble examination to be embraced and the Master of the Rolls 
legitimately distinguished the unsuitable strain between the ap-
proach concentrated on the proper law of the agreement and on 
the law of the seat. As Lord Justice Moore-Bick stated, the start-
ing point for the investigation ought to have been an assumption 
that the parties intended that the arbitration agreement should 
be governed by the law that governed the contract as a whole.
However, the approach the court took in the end was that 
there was no implied choice of law for the arbitration agreement 
and therefore it should be governed by the law of the seat un-
did the clarity. The components that the court depended upon 
to override the assumption for the best possible law were not 
by any means convincing and could even be said to build a 
contending assumption for the law under which the arbitration 
agreement is destined to be commonly enforceable to the ex-
clusion of other factors.  
Given the uncertainty that remains in this area of law, if the 
consortium seeks leave to appeal, the Supreme Court should 
review the case so that it can make a more unequivocal en-
dorsement of the traditional approach to this issue and re-es-
tablish the effective presumption in favor of the proper law of 
the contract. This will provide the maximum level of certainty to 
commercial parties when negotiating their contracts.  
It can be said that this decision somehow tried to clarify the 
issue related to the confusion that exists in international com-
mercial arbitration, thus it also may be argued that some clarifi-
cations still are needed.  
Correspondingly, conflict of laws issues and its relationship 
with the international commercial arbitration has always been 
a difficult and delicate issue. From the very beginning, in case 
there is no explicit choice of law by the parties, arbitrators strug-
gle with the question which regime of private international law 
or what law applies to the case at stake. While national courts 
have strict rules to apply their national conflict of laws rules.
In various aspects, such as law applicable to arbitration 
agreements, arbitral proceedings, substance of dispute, recog-
nition and enforcement of the arbitral awards, arbitral tribunal 
will have to decide which conflict of laws rules it should apply, 
rules of arbitral seat or other. In this respect, arbitrators enjoy a 
big power to decide which laws to apply. This is based on the 
text of different legislation, as an example, Article 28(2) of 
UNCI-TRAL Model Law states: “Failing any designation by the 
parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by 
the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable”. Based 
on this provision, we can clearly see that Model Law gives 
opportunity to the tribunal to apply, not limited set of the rules 
but any conflict of laws rules he deems appropriate. In this 
regard, in contrast to domestic courts, tribunal enjoys bigger 
power when choosing law and is not bound by Private Inter-
national law rules. For example, among the different potentially 
applicable laws is the 
Consequences of the Separability Presumption for the Choice of Law Applicable to Arbitration Agreements
75
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN: 2233-3878, e-ISSN: 2346-8262; Volume 4, Issue 2, 2015
closest connection test – Rome I Regulation; the law of the arbi-
tral seat or the law of the place, where the arbitration agreement 
is concluded. However, these various conflict of laws rules may 
lead to different results, uncertainty, confusion, which conflict 
with the main aim of arbitration to provide efficiency. Because 
of this efficiency and flexibility for the parties to adopt to the dis-
pute, the rules that they deep proper or choose the law that 
they know and are familiar with, are the reason why Internation-
al Commercial Arbitration is so popular nowadays and a lot of 
businessman or businesswoman choose this way of settlement 
of their dispute in contrast to courts. Eventually, this automatic 
shift of conflict of laws rules will lead to injustice towards those 
who failed to come up with their minds and think for the laws that 
govern both contract and arbitration agreement.
Although this happens very rarely, especially in practice, 
a lot of questions still need to be answered: are the separate 
application of choice of law rules and the applicable law indeed 
based on the separability presumption? What are the conse-
quences for the arbitration clause, when the main contract is 
terminated? Does it entail that arbitration agreement is termi-
nated as well? Fortunately, all these questions can be answered 
by the separability presumption. In my opinion, separability pre-
sumption is related to the application of the conflict of laws rules 
and the applicable law. It gives opportunity to the arbitration 
agreement to still continue its existence and be decided. With-
out this principle, declaring the main contract invalid also will 
have consequences for the validity of arbitration agreement and 
therefore, tribunal will be prevented to hear the dispute.         
Despite the fact that parties may not take into consideration 
that different law can be applicable to their main contract and 
arbitration agreement, separability presumption gives chance 
to the arbitration agreement to live. Therefore, even if the main 
contract is recognized null, void or terminated based on the 
competence-competence doctrine tribunal shall still decide on 
the validity of the arbitration agreement. Of course there are 
some conflict of laws rules, which will limit the choice of appli-
cable law, simply because the arbitration is excluded from its 
scope, for example Brussels I regulation or Rome I Regulation.
Rome I Regulation as conflict of laws rules, has some im-
pact on international commercial arbitration. According to the 
Article 1(1) the material scope of the Rome I Regulation deals 
only with the contractual relationship in civil and commercial 
matters. Article 1(2) of Rome I limit the regulations application 
to certain matters, meaning that it does not apply to customs, 
revenue or administrative matters. Also it extends exclusion of 
arbitration and choice of court agreements. 
Let us have a brief look on the road taken by the regulation 
and explain why Rome I does not cover the arbitration agree-
ments? And whether arbitrators have the duty to apply Rome I? 
During the negotiation on the issue on stake – exclude or 
not the arbitration agreements from the scope of Rome I – on 
the one hand, delegation from the United Kingdom defended 
the inclusion of the arbitration agreements based on two points: 
i) arbitration agreements as a contractual nature was not differ-
ent from other agreements, and ii) the existed international con-
ventions on the arbitration were inadequate in the manner that 
they did not have the proper provision on the law applicable to 
the arbitration agreements and that those international conven-
tions having no universal scope, in contrast to the Rome I, were 
not ratified by all the Member states. On the other hand, form 
the German and French delegations perspective the inclusion 
of the arbitration agreements would increase the number of the 
conventions in this area. The justified reason of this view was 
the separability presumption that was included in the draft and 
therefore, made the arbitration clause autonomous from the un-
derlining contract. In addition, they argued that concept of clos-
est connection was heard to apply to arbitration agreements, 
because the separation of contractual and procedural aspect of 
the arbitration agreements were difficult. 
In my opinion, two main uncertainties exist regarding the 
application of Rome I to the arbitration agreements: First, Rome 
I excludes the arbitration agreements, but it can be used in order 
to determine the application of the law to the substance of the 
disputes. As the arbitrators, in case of  absence of the choice of 
law by the parties, it applies the conflict of laws rules, in order 
to determine the law applicable to the merits. Though, weather 
the arbitration agreements should have been excluded from the 
Rome I application is rather debatable. However, I believe that 
the Article 1(2)(e) has rather vague provision, meaning that it is 
hard to see what this exclusion really covers, as there are varie-
ties of laws applicable to international Commercial Arbitration: 
- Law that applies to arbitration agreement - governs the
scope, validity and interpretation of the arbitration agreements;
- Law that applies to arbitration proceedings – governs the
constitution of the tribunal, powers of the arbitrators, including 
the grounds for challenge;
- And the law that governs the substance of the dispute
– that covers the validity and interpretation of the contract, con-
sequences of breach of contract, rights and obligations of the 
parties.
Second, besides the fact that more than one law exists in 
International Arbitration different wording of Rome I Regula-
tion and Brussels I Regulation underline the ambiguity as well. 
Rome I does not explicitly exclude the arbitration from its scope 
entirely, as for example, Brussels I regulation under Article 1(2)
(d), which not only excludes arbitration agreements, but the 
whole arbitration.
The issues on uncertainty were addressed by Mario Gi-
uliano and Paul Legarde in their Report on the Convention on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations, where they 
stated that “The exclusion of arbitration agreements does 
not relate solely to the procedural aspects, but also to the 
formation, validity and effects of such agreements. Where the 
arbitration clause forms an integral part of a contract, the exclu-
sion relates only to the clause itself and not to the contract as 
a whole. This exclusion does not prevent such clauses being 
taken into consideration for the purposes of Article 
3(1).” (Giuliano, Legarde, 1980, pp.11,12).
From the reports perspective, we can clearly see that the 
Rome I not only excludes the procedural part but also the ef-
fects, validity and formation of the arbitration agreement. In ad-
dition, though report doesnot address the issue of law governing 
the substance of the dispute, by virtue of separability presump-
tion it separates the arbitration clause from the underling/main 
contract and therefore states that Rome I applies only to the rest 
of the contract and not to the arbitration agreements. Here we 
can strongly point out that the separability presumption plays a 
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great role. It makes possible for the arbitration agreement and 
the main contract to be governed by the different laws. 
Another explanation regarding the limited exclusion of the 
arbitration agreements from the Rome I addressed by the Re-
port was the Recital 127  of the Regulation that accepts the ar-
bitration agreement as one of the pillars to determine the law 
applicable to the merits of the dispute based on the Article 3(1) 
of Rome I Regulation. 
Despite the controversies that do exist nowadays whether 
Rome I Regulation should be applicable to the arbitration agree-
ments or not, the practice shows that some tribunals do apply 
to it. The reason may be the fact that UNCITRAL Model Law or 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules require the arbitrators to apply 
the conflict of law rules that they deem appropriate, while deter-
mining the law that parties failed to choose. Rome I Regulation 
was used regardless of the fact whether it was in force in the 
countries of which the parties were nationals (Poudret, Bens-
son, 2007, pp. 687, 584-5).  For example, a tribunal seated in 
Milan, while deciding on the law applicable to the contract, used 
the conflict of laws rules in the Rome I Regulation as a part of 
the Italian law (ICC court bulletin, 1999, p. 83-87). Same ap-
proach was taken by the Sole arbitrator seated in the Brussels 
in the dispute between the Belgium and Dutch company, when 
determining the consistence of the valid choice of law clause 
with the position stated by the parties. 
From the Arbitration outlook, in contrast to the courts, ar-
bitrators do not have forum and therefore, they are not bound 
by the conflict of laws rules of the seat of the arbitration (Red-
fern, Hunter 2009, pp. 3.216-18). As a result, when parties fail 
to determine the law, arbitrators’ have flexibility and freedom to 
choose law applicable to the merits of the dispute they deep ap-
propriate. On these bases, it is said that the arbitrators, in order 
to choose the law applicable to the substance of the dispute, will 
refer to the conflict of laws rules of the arbitral seat or use the 
closest connection test. Also, cumulative approach – choosing 
from variety of conflicts of laws rules - can be taken as well. 
Not to forget the amiables compositeurs that allows arbitra-
tors to decide on their common sense, fairness and a good 
faith the outcome of the dispute without consulting the rules. 
As to the European Law perspective, if the dispute is con-
cerned to the contractual obligations the arbitrators determining 
the law applicable to the dispute have to apply the provisions of 
Rome I Regulation, whereas in case the parties agreed to settle 
their dispute based on the institutional rules in the arbitration 
than those rules would prevail over the Rome I Regulation. But 
if arbitrators are not required to apply the Rome I, in the world of 
EU failure to apply the rules of European Union that have man-
datory or public policy nature will result in breach or error of EU 
law. The consequence to this breach can be the fact that arbitral 
award can be challenged under the Member states courts Na-
tional Law, although it wound not affect the validity of the award 
as the arbitrators’ awards on the choice of law are not subject to 
review by the EU courts.  
Therefore, it can be noted that Rome I convention is only 
applicable to the International Commercial Arbitration while di-
vining the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. However, 
the question whether the arbitrator is bound to apply the rules 
of Rome I Regulation still remains. Thus, during the research I 
found out that the answer on this question very much depends 
on the arbitrators’ powers to give effect to their rights to decide 
the law applicable to the case on their own motion. This mo-
tion is granted by the procedural law of the arbitration that can 
require them to turn to the EU law – Rome I regulation for in-
stance. 
Conclusion
To sum up all above said, it can be said that the separability 
presumption is usually being applied in order to be sure that, 
even if the main contract is invalid, the arbitration agreement or 
the arbitration clause can still survive. The rational for the sepa-
rability presumption is to help parties to save their rights and to 
be able to dispute in the forum they prefer. It can also be said 
that the separability presumption is a kind of practical necessity, 
without which each party will be unable to avoid arbitration just 
only by contesting the contract in which the arbitration agree-
ment is  incorporated. 
However, it should also be noted that the well established 
fact that arbitration agreement may be governed by different 
law than the main contract derives from the approaches taken 
in International Commercial Arbitration. One should not forget 
that though the fact is established, separabaility presumption 
is a presumption and not more. As a result of the application 
of the variety of rules, developed by the commentators and the 
arbitral tribunal parties are taken the opportunity to resolve their 
dispute in the court they want.  The advantage of the arbitration 
is that parties have the chance, in contrast to the court system, 
to settle their drama in the regime they have chosen before-
hand. When discussing the separability and its consequences, 
it is hard to keep the line, to keep both, ups and downs and at 
the same time not to shake the assumption that already exist in 
International commercial Arbitration.  
Nowadays there are a lot of contradictory views which do 
not lead to the solutions. Even for instance, the approach taken 
by the English courts that started determining the law applicable 
to the arbitration agreements from the choice of law ending to 
the law of the seat, got the arbitration world to much more con-
troversy than it was before. The clash that exists even between 
the different courts in different countries taking different decision 
does not lead to the uniformity and the balance of the system.  
However, one is surely clear that in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings in future, parties need to learn to expressly 
provide their arbitration agreement or the arbitration clause that 
is incorporated in the main contract, which law is applicable to 
their dispute.
7 “An agreement between the parties to confer on one or more courts or tribunals of a Member State exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
disputes under the contract should be one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a choice of law has been clearly 
demonstrated.”
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